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Abstract—The integration of microgrids that depend on the
renewable distributed energy resources with the current power
systems is a critical issue in the smart grid. In this paper, we
propose a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework to study
the strategic behavior of distributed microgrids that generate
renewable energies and characterize the power generation solu-
tions by using the Nash equilibrium concept. Our framework not
only incorporates economic factors but also takes into account
the stability and efficiency of the microgrids, including the power
flow constraints and voltage angle regulations. We develop two
decentralized update schemes for microgrids and show their
convergence to a unique Nash equilibrium. Also, we propose a
novel fully distributed PMU-enabled algorithm which only needs
the information of voltage angle at the bus. To show the resiliency
of the distributed algorithm, we introduce two failure models of
the smart grid. Case studies based on the IEEE 14-bus system
are used to corroborate the effectiveness and resiliency of the
proposed algorithms.
Index Terms—Microgrids, Renewable energy, resilient, dis-
tributed control, non-cooperative game, power flow, smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Renewable energies, such as solar, wind energy, geothermal
and biomass, play an important role in reducing the emission
of greenhouse gases and thus are able to mitigate the climate
change. Their gradual replacements of the conventional power
plants, which generate air polluting by-products including SO2
and NOx, are beneficial to reduce the health risks to the human
society [1]. According to the energy report Annual Energy
Outlook 2015, the total renewable share of all electricity
generation increases from 13% in 2013 to 18% in 2040
[2]. Therefore, it is critical to motivate more participants to
generate renewable energies, and thus transform the traditional
power grid to a cleaner and more efficient system.
A microgrid is a green system that relies on the renewable
distributed resources such as wind turbines, photovoltaics and
fuel cells, and it is able to operate independently from the main
power grid in an autonomous manner [3], [4]. Currently, more
and more microgrids are integrated with the main power grid
for system dependability and resiliency [5], [6]. For example,
when a generator in the main grid is out of service, microgrids
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Fig. 1. Smart grid hierarchy model including the generators, microgrids
and communications. Generators in the upper layer determine their amount
of power generations and the electricity price and send them to the bottom
layer. A microgrid can generate renewable energies and make decisions by
responding to the strategies of generators and other microgrids.
can generate extra power, and inject it into the grid to meet the
demand and regulate voltage. Hence, they can play the role of
maintaining the stability and reliability of the power system.
In this paper, we consider the distributed energy man-
agement of microgrids when they are integrated with the
power grid. With deregulation, future microgrids can enter
the electricity market to sell renewable energies at a cheaper
price. Reversely, they can also buy electricity from other
agents. Each microgrid is making a decision on the amount
of power generation to optimize their payoffs. In addition,
their strategies are based on the physical and economic factors
including the power flow in the system, renewable energy
production limit, electricity market price and generation cost
[7], [8], [9]. The participation of microgrids into the power
market, therefore, introduces a competing mechanism between
different microgrid entities. Fig. 1 depicts a two-layer system
model of the smart grid. Specifically, the upper layer contain-
ing conventional generators forms a generator network, and
the distributed renewable energy generators in the bottom layer
constitutes the microgrid network. The information exchange,
such as the electricity market price and the amount of power
generation, between two layers are through the communication
network lay in the middle. On one hand, generators generate
power supplied to the loads in the grid, and we assume that
their amount is determined ahead of time and thus fixed. On
the other hand, microgrids are capable of energy generation
to meet their own needs or sell the extra power to the energy
market to make a profit.
A natural framework to capture the competition and decen-
tralized decision making of microgrids is game theory [10],
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[11]. We use a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework to
study the strategic behavior of microgrids in the power grid
from a cross-layer perspective. Thus, microgrids are players
in this renewable energy game. Different from the centralized
control of power systems which is based on the optimal power
flow, we adopt Nash equilibrium as our solution concept
to characterize the control actions of microgrids. To design
an automated energy management system, we develop two
update schemes including the iterative update algorithm and
random update algorithm which enable the independent deci-
sion making of microgrids. However, they need the support
from the communication network as depicted in Fig. 1 for
the information exchange. To make the control system more
intelligent and efficient, we also propose a PMU-enabled
distributed algorithm that only depends on the smart device,
phasor measurement unit (PMU) [12], to measure the voltage
angles at the buses. By using this scheme, each microgrid does
not need to know the specific amount of generation of other
players, nor the power supplied by the generators, but can
randomly update its strategy only based on the phasor angle
at its bus, which preserves high privacy.
The distributed iterative algorithm developed in this work
enhances the resilience of the grid by enabling the real-time
response to system changes. Power systems tend to fail, such
as generator breakdown and trigger of the power transmission
lines, due to natural disasters, man-made mistakes and cyber
attacks [13], [14], [15]. Therefore, by investigating the two-
layer smart grid framework under these faulty scenarios,
we can assess the resiliency of the proposed PMU-enabled
algorithm.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follow.
1) We establish a non-cooperative game-theoretic frame-
work to model the renewable energy generation planning
of microgrids in the smart grid, especially by considering
the physical and economic constraints.
2) We propose two iterative and random update algorithms
for the decision making of microgrids and derive suffi-
cient conditions to ensure their convergence to a unique
Nash equilibrium.
3) We develop a resilient and fully distributed PMU-
enabled update algorithm for microgrids, and design
its implementation control framework. Moreover, two
major fault models of the smart grid are introduced to
validate the resiliency of the distributed algorithm.
A. Related Work
Game-theoretic methods have been used for generation
planning and control of the distributed energy resources in
smart grid [11], [16], [17], [18]. Zhu et al. [9] have proposed a
non-cooperative game framework for distributed generation in
power systems, and considered economic and AC power flow
constraints. Our work extends their model and algorithms to a
distributed and resilient fashion. A two-level game-theoretic
approach has been used to model the demand response in
the cross-layer smart grid framework shown in Fig. 1 which
includes both user and utility side [19], [20], [21]. They also
developed distributed algorithms to find the equilibrium solu-
tion. However, their main focuses have been on the economic
dispatch and generations, and physical constraints, e.g., power
flow equations [14], [22], are not part of their model. Our work
is focused on the interactions in the lower layer, and it can be
naturally extended to the two-level framework by regarding
the generators as active players.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we formulate the problem and present a game-theoretic
framework to model the generation control in microgrids.
We analyze the game in Section III and propose three up-
date schemes to find the equilibrium solution in Section IV.
Implementation framework of the PMU-enabled distributed
algorithm is developed in Section V. Case studies are given
in Section VI, and Section VII concludes the paper.
C. Notations and Conventions
Notations and conventions adopted in this paper are sum-
marized as follows: P := [P1, P2, ..., PN ]′ ∈ RN , θ :=
[θ1, θ2, ..., θN ]
′ ∈ RN ; Pd := [P1, P2, ..., PNd ]′ ∈ RNd , Pgd :=
[P g1 , P
g
2 , ..., P
g
Nd
]′ ∈ RNd ; q := [q1, q2, ..., qNd ]′ ∈ RNd ; Su-
perscripts o and ∗ indicate the parameter achieving the optimal
and equilibrium, respectively; Use of (n) in the superscript
indicates the nth iteration. In addition, microgrid and player
refer to the same entity, and they are used interchangeably.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first review some power flow basics, and
then formulate the problem.
A. Power Flow Preliminaries
In a power grid, let N := {r, 1, 2, ..., N} be a set of
N + 1 buses, where r denotes the slack bus. Denote Pi, Qi,
Vi and θi as the amount of active power injection, reactive
power injection, voltage magnitude and voltage angle at bus
i, respectively. Then, the power flow equations of the system
with reference to the slack bus r are
Pi =
∑
j∈N
ViVj [Gij cos(θi − θj) +Bij sin(θi − θj)], (1)
Qi =
∑
j∈N
ViVj [Gij sin(θi − θj)−Bij cos(θi − θj)], (2)
for i, j = 1, 2, ..., N , where Gij and Bij are the real and
imaginary part of the element (i, j) in the admittance matrix
Y ∈ CN×N of the power grid. Note that Vr and θr are both
known, and specifically, θr = 0.
Let P gi and P
l
i be the power generation and power load at
bus i, respectively. Then, the active power injection at bus i
satisfies
Pi = P
g
i − P li , ∀i ∈ N . (3)
Moreover, by considering the balance of the grid, we have∑
i∈N P
g
i =
∑
i∈N P
l
i .
DC approximation is usually used for fast calculations of the
power flow [14]. Assume that the reactance is much smaller
than the resistance on transmission lines; the voltage angles
θi, i ∈ N , are small, and the voltages Vi, i ∈ N , are equal
to 1. Then, Qi = 0, i ∈ N , and sin(θi − θj) ≈ θi − θj ,
cos(θi − θj) ≈ 1. Therefore, power flow equations can be
represented by a set of linear equations as Pi =
∑
j 6=iBij(θi−
θj), ∀i, j ∈ N , which can be written in a matrix form as
P = −Bθ. (4)
Remark 1: Matrix B includes the imaginary components
of Y except the slack bus’s row and column. Since −B is a
symmetric reduced Laplacian matrix, then, B is invertible by
the Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem [23].
B. Game-Theoretic Framework
Consider the smart grid is composed of load buses and
generator buses. We denote Nd := {1, 2, ..., Nd} ⊆ N as the
set of Nd buses that can generate renewable energies such as
the wind and solar power. Therefore, buses in the set Nd are
able to generate power for self-efficiency. In addition, denote
Ng := {Nd+1, Nd+2, ..., N} = N \Nd as a set of Ng buses
that are either PQ-loads or generators, where set N excludes
the slack bus r for notation clarity. For load bus i ∈ N , it
has specified load P li , and for generator bus j ∈ N , it has
predetermined generation P gj .
Furthermore, for buses in the set of Nd, they are connected
with the microgrids that are able to generate renewable ener-
gies. Their loads to be serviced are specified ahead of time, and
their generations of renewable energy need to be determined.
Note that each microgrid has a maximum generation, i.e.,
0 ≤ P gi ≤ P gi,max, i ∈ Nd. P gi,max depends on the available
stored power of the microgrid, and it is dynamically changing
due to the intermittent nature of renewable generations. For
convenience, the framework is studied for a given P gi,max in
this paper, and it can be generalized to dynamic P gi,max if the
state-of-charge of storage devices is considered. In addition,
for buses in Ng , we set the power generation of PQ-load bus
to 0, and the power load of generator bus to 0 without loss of
generality,.
Before formulating the game-theoretic framework for this
power generation game, we make several assumptions as
follows. First, the topology of the whole power system is
known to all microgrids. This is justifiable since the parameters
of power transmission lines, such as resistance and reactance,
are often known. Second, the constraints of each microgrid
are common information, and each microgrid is aware of
the physical constraints when making decisions [24], [25].
This indicates that every microgrid should take the power
flow constraints (4) into account. Third, power generations
are given for all generators, and microgrids take actions by
responding to the generator network. This is reasonable since
microgrids can regulate itself more quickly than the generators,
and they can be viewed as followers who respond to the
generators [9], [19], [20]. We also assume that PMU can
be employed to measure the voltage angle at the bus for all
microgrids which is already a mature technology in the smart
grid [12].
Let G :=
{Nd, {PGi ,Θi}i∈Nd , {Ui}i∈Nd ,P} be a strategic
game with a set Nd of Nd players. {PGi ,Θi} is the action set
of player i, where PGi := {P gi ∈ R+ | 0 ≤ P gi ≤ P gi,max},
and P is the feasible set of active power injection defined
by constraint (4). For convenience, denote {PG−i,Θ−i} by the
Cartesian product of all players’ action sets except i’th one. In
addition, denote PG by the feasible set of power generation of
all buses in the grid, which can be obtained by using P through
(3). Then, the feasible renewable generation set of game G can
be defined by PGF :=
(⊗i∈NdPGi )∩PG . In addition, based on
the set PGF , we can obtain the feasible voltage angle profile of
all players ΘF through (4). Thus, the feasible action set of all
players {P gi , θi}i∈Nd can be defined as F := PGF ×ΘF . Note
that game G is coupled through the power flow equations.
The cost function Ui : PGi × [0, pi]→ R for player i is given
by
Ui(P
g
i , θi) = ψiP
g
i + ζ(P
l
i − P gi ) +
1
2
η2i θ
2
i , i ∈ Nd, (5)
where ψi is the unit cost of generated power for player i, ζ
is the unit price of renewable energy for sale defined by the
power market, and ηi is a weighting parameter that indicates
the importance of regulations of voltage angle at bus i. Note
that in (5), player i prefers a small voltage angle ηi which
satisfies a condition of using DC approximated power flow.
Then, the optimization problem for player i is
OPi : min
P gi ,θi
Ui(P
g
i , θi)
s.t. P = −Bθ,
0 ≤P gi ≤ P gi,max, i ∈ Nd.
The renewable generation game G is a constrained game. A
Nash equilibrium (NE) solution pair (Pg∗d ,θ
∗
d), where P
g∗
d =
[P g∗i ]i∈Nd , θ
∗
d = [θ
∗
i ]i∈Nd , is a point where no player can
benefit from deviating from it through changing his strategy.
The formal definition of NE of game G is as follows.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium of Game G with Coupled
Constraints): The solution pair (Pg∗d ,θ
∗
d) constitutes a Nash
equilibrium point for the microgrids in the non-cooperative
game G if, for ∀i ∈ Nd,
Ui(P
g∗
i , θ
∗
i ) ≤ Ui(P gi , θi), ∀(P gi , θi) ∈ Φi(P g∗−i , θ∗−i),
where Φi(P
g∗
−i , θ
∗
−i) is a projected constraint set defined by
Φi(P
g∗
−i , θ
∗
−i) := {(P gi , θi) : (P gi , θi;P g∗−i , θ∗−i) ∈ F}.
C. Team Problem
For comparison, we formulate a team problem (TP) that
captures the global optimality of the smart grid as
TP : min
P gi ,θi
∑
i∈Nd
αiUi(P
g
i , θi)
s.t. P = −Bθ,
0 ≤ P gi ≤ P gi,max, i ∈ Nd,
where αi ∈ (0, 1), i ∈ Nd, are the weights on microgrids
such that
∑Nd
i=1 αi = 1. Note that the weighting constant αi
indicates the importance of microgrid i among all players, and
it is chosen or assigned by a system coordinator in the smart
grid.
Denote the optimal solution to the TP as Pgod =
[P goi ]i∈Nd , θ
o
d = [θ
o
i ]i∈Nd . Then, the loss of efficiency (LOE)
due to the decentralized decision making is defined as
LOE :=
∑
i∈Nd αiUi(P
g∗
i , θ
∗
i )∑
i∈Nd αiUi(P
go
i , θ
o
i )
.
Remark 2: The value of LOE satisfies 0 < LOE ≤ 1.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GAME
Before finding the solution to the formulated optimization
problem in Section II, we reformulate and analyze the renew-
able generation game in this section.
Since B is nonsingular, then, (4) can be rewritten as
θ = SP, (6)
where S:=[sij ]i,j∈N = −B−1. The property of elements in
matrix S is summarized in lemma 1.
Lemma 1. S is a symmetric matrix, and sij ≥ 0, ∀ i, j ∈ N ,
and especially sii > 0, ∀ i ∈ N .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Power flow equations (4) and (6) are equivalent, then,
problem OPi for player i can be simplified as follows.
Proposition 1. The optimization problem OPi for player i is
equivalent to the following problem:
OP′i : min
P gi ,θi
Ui(P
g
i , θi)
s.t. θi =
∑
j∈N
sijPj ,
0 ≤ P gi ≤ P gi,max, i ∈ Nd.
Proof: The decision variables in the objective func-
tion (5) for player i are P gi and θi. In addition, equation
θi =
∑
j∈N sijPj includes all the information related to
the decision variables in the original power flow constraint
P = −Bθ, and thus OPi and OP′i are equivalent for ∀i ∈ Nd.
Next, by plugging constraint θi =
∑
j∈N sijPj into the
objective function, we obtain
U˜i(P
g
i , P
g
−i) = ψiP
g
i + ζ(P
l
i −P gi ) +
1
2
η2i (
∑
j∈N
sijPj)
2, (7)
for i ∈ Nd, where U˜i : PGi ×PG−i → R, and it is strictly convex
over P gi . Note that after simplification, the objective function
(7) is only related to the amount of power generation. Then, we
can define a new game G˜ :=
{Nd, {P G˜i }i∈Nd , {U˜i}i∈Nd ,P}
which is equivalent to game G. Note that the action set P G˜i
of player i, i ∈ Nd, and the feasible set P G˜F of game G˜ is the
same as the one in game G, respectively. In addition, power
flow equations are not in the constraints of G˜ anymore. Then,
game G˜ can be categorized to a generalized Nash equilibrium
problem [26], [27]. Instead of directly applying the general
results from [26], [27], we analyze the renewable generation
game by considering its unique characteristics to obtain more
insights. The definition of Nash equilibrium of game G˜ is as
follows.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium of Game G˜): The set of re-
newable generation profile Pg∗d constitutes a Nash equilibrium
point for the microgrids in the non-cooperative game G˜ if
U˜i(P
g∗
i , P
g∗
−i) ≤ U˜i(P gi , P g∗−i), ∀P gi ∈ P G˜i , i ∈ Nd.
Note that for a given Pgd, there exists a unique corre-
sponding voltage angle profile θd. Thus, there is a one-to-
one correspondence between Pgd and θd. Therefore, the Nash
equilibrium solution to game G, (Pg∗d ,θ
∗
d), is strategically
equivalent to the NE solution to game G˜, Pg∗d . Then, by
using the first-order optimality condition to (7), we obtain
ψi − ζ + η2i (
∑
j∈N sijPj)sii = 0, i ∈ Nd. By defining
gi := siiPi, g¯−i :=
∑
j 6=i∈N sijPj and since sii 6= 0, i ∈ Nd,
we have gi = ζ−ψiη2i sii − g¯−i, i ∈ Nd, which is equivalent to
Pi =
1
sii
(
ζ − ψi
η2i sii
− g¯−i), i ∈ Nd. (8)
For convenience, define a player specific parameter γi for
ith player as γi := ζ−ψiη2i sii , and denote P
max
i = P
g
i,max − P li .
To find the equilibrium solution, we express the set of fixed
point equations (8) in a matrix form
1 s12s11
s13
s11
· · · s1Nds11
s21
s22
1 s23s22 · · ·
s2Nd
s22
...
...
...
. . .
...
sNd1
sNdNd
sNd2
sNdNd
· · · sNdNd−1sNdNd 1


P ∗1
P ∗2
...
P ∗Nd
 =

q1
q2
...
qNd

⇔ HP∗d = q, (9)
where H := [ sijsii ]i,j∈Nd , q := [qi]i∈Nd = [
γi
sii
−∑
j∈Ng sijPj ]i∈Nd , and P
∗
d := [P
∗
i ]i∈Nd = [P
g∗
i − P li ]i∈Nd .
On one hand, if the solution to (9) is an inner point that
satisfies 0 ≤ P gi ≤ P gi,max, ∀i ∈ Nd, then it is a feasible
optimal solution. On the other hand, if player i’s payoff attains
its minimum at a generation level out of the feasible interval,
then, the optimal solution will be achieved at the boundary
point. Specifically, Pi has the following form:
Pi =

−P li , if γi ≤ g¯−i − siiP li ,
Pmaxi , if γi ≥ g¯−i + siiPmaxi ,
1
sii
(γi − g¯−i), otherwise.
(10)
The above results are summarized in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The renewable energy generation game G˜ admits
a unique Nash equilibrium, and the net power injection of
player i to the grid is given by (10).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Next, we analyze the connection between the team optimal
solution and Nash equilibrium solution as follows.
Corollary 1. The optimal solution to the team problem is
identical with the game solution, and thus LOE = 1.
Proof: Since (Pgod ,θ
o
d) is an optimal solution to the team
problem, then, for ∀t ∈ Nd,∑
i∈Nd
αiUi(P
go
i , θ
o
i ) ≤
∑
j 6=t∈Nd
αjUj(P
go
j , θ
o
j ) + αtUt(P
g
t , θt),
where P gt ∈ PGt , θt ∈ Θt. Therefore, αtUt(P got , θot ) ≤
αtUt(P
g
t , θt), and (P
go
t , θ
o
t ) is a solution to OPi, ∀t ∈ Nd.
Note that (Pgod ,θ
o
d) satisfies the power flow constraints, and
thus it is in the projected constraint set in Definition 1. Then,
it directly follows that (Pgod ,θ
o
d) constitutes a NE of game G.
Since game G is equivalent to game G˜, Pgod is a NE of game
G˜. Based on Theorem 1, we obtain Pgod = P
g∗
d . Therefore,
(Pgod ,θ
o
d) = (P
g∗
d ,θ
∗
d) and LOE = 1.
Remark 3: From Corollary 1, we know that the solution
obtained via the decentralized decision making is as efficient
as that obtained by the centralized control of microgrids.
IV. UPDATE SCHEMES FOR THE GENERATION GAME
We have analyzed the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium of the renewable energy generation game
in Section III. In this section, we first present iterative update
algorithm (IUA) and random update algorithm (RUA) which
are based on the gradient-descent method [28], and then
design a PMU-enabled distributed algorithm to compute the
NE solution of the game. The iterative algorithms enable the
adaptivity and resilience of the grid in response to disruptive
events. We will show their convergence to NE solutions and
study their rates of convergence.
A. Iterative Update Algorithm
The iterative update algorithm is a scheme that each player
updates their amount of power generation simultaneously at
time step n which is given by
P
(n+1)
i = Ψi(γi, g¯
(n)
−i )
= min
(
Pmaxi , max
[− P li , 1sii (γi − g¯(n)−i )]
)
= min
(
Pmaxi , max
[− P li ,
1
sii
(γi −
∑
j∈Ng
sijPj −
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sijP
(n)
j )
])
.
(11)
The IUA converges to the unique Nash equilibrium
P ∗i = min
(
Pmaxi , max
[ − P li , 1sii (γi − ∑j∈Ng sijPj −∑
j 6=i∈Nd sijP
∗
j )
])
, which is equivalent to
P g∗i = min
(
P gi,max, max
[
0,
1
sii
(γi −
∑
j∈Ng
sijPj
−
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sijP
∗
j ) + P
l
i
])
from any feasible initial point of P gi , ∀i ∈ Nd. A sufficient
condition that ensures the global stability and convergence
of IUA is summarized in Theorem 2. Note that the IUA
algorithm implicitly handles the local capacity constraints and
the coupled network constraints in OPi. Hence, each iteration
yields a feasible solution of OPi.
Theorem 2. The iterative update algorithm is stable and
converges to the unique Nash equilibrium if the following
condition holds
max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1) < 1. (12)
Proof: See Appendix C.
The IUA requires that microgrids update their actions syn-
chronously. In cases where synchronization is not possible,
we develop a generalized mechanism in the next subsection
to capture the asynchronous and random updates.
B. Random Update Algorithm
When no synchronization mechanism exists between play-
ers, one more practical update scheme is random update algo-
rithm. More specifically, the players update their generations
of the renewable energy in the discrete time intervals with
a predefined probability 0 < τi < 1, i ∈ Nd. The random
update algorithm is
P
(n+1)
i =
{
Ψi(γi, g¯
(n)
−i ), with probability τi,
P
(n)
i , with probability 1− τi,
(13)
where Ψi is defined in (11).
For the stability and convergence of the random update
algorithm, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The random update algorithm is globally stable
and converges to the unique Nash equilibrium almost surely
if the following condition holds
τ¯ · max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1) < τ, (14)
where τ¯ and τ are the upper bound and lower bound of the
probability τi, respectively, for ∀i ∈ Nd.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 4: When all players have the same probability
of update, i.e., τi = τ, ∀i ∈ Nd, then, (14) is reduced to
maxi,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1) < 1, which is the same as (12).
In the IUA and RUA, the players compute their optimal
renewable energy generations based on the market electricity
price provided by the generator network, and the specific
generated power of all other players and generators in the
grid. In order to know these information, one possible solution
is that all microgrids and generators send their amount of
generation to a data center, and then the center broadcasts
the received information. Therefore, IUA and RUA actually
highly depend on the communication networks which are
costly and not confidential. These drawbacks motivate us to
design a distributed and convenient update scheme in the
ensuing subsection.
C. PMU-enabled Distributed Algorithm
In our proposed PMU-enabled distributed algorithm (PDA),
players do not need to share their private information, e.g.,
active power injection, and do not need to know the power
supplied by the generators. Moreover, PDA does not need the
synchronization mechanism as that in IUA since they update
their strategies at any time interval. Hence, its update fashion
Algorithm 1 PMU-enabled distributed algorithm
1: Initialize P (0)i ← 0, P li , Pmaxi , τi, ∀i ∈ Nd, Pj , j ∈ Ng ,
tolerance δ > 0, P (1) ← 2δ, n← 1
2: while ‖Pg(n)d − Pg(n−1)d ‖∞ > δ do
3: while i ≤ Nd do
4: Generate a random number k between [0, 1] with
uniform distribution
5: if k ≤ τi then
6: PMU measures voltage angle θ(n)i at bus i
7: Obtain P (n+1)i through (16)
8: else
9: P
(n+1)
i ← P (n)i
10: end if
11: i← i+ 1
12: end while
13: n← n+ 1
14: end while
15: P g∗i = P
(n)
i + P
l
i , i ∈ Nd
16: return P g∗i , i ∈ Nd
is similar to RUA but requires much less information. Note
that in the smart grid, power flow equation θ = SP leads to∑
j∈Ng
sijPj +
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sijPj = θi − siiPi, ∀i ∈ Nd. (15)
Therefore, based on (11) and (15), one way for player i to
update his action at time n is to know the current voltage
angle θ(n)i at his bus which can be measured by PMU, and
his net power injection update scheme is given by
P
(n+1)
i = min
(
Pmaxi , max
[− P li ,
1
sii
(γi − θ(n)i + siiP (n)i )
])
. (16)
The only required knowledge for each player in this scheme
are the electricity price and smart grid topology which are
both known. Moreover, this distributed algorithm is stable and
converges to the unique Nash equilibrium almost surely. The
proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 only by changing g¯(n)−i
to θ(n)i − siiP (n)i and thus omitted here. For clarity, PDA is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
Remark 5: When a microgrid updates its generated renew-
able energy, it will consequently change the voltage angle
profile {θi}i∈N in the smart grid. Therefore, θ(n)i in (16) will
be changed due to other players’ updates which makes the
distributed algorithm feasible.
D. Convergence Rate Analysis
One method to measure the efficiency of the update al-
gorithm is its convergence rate which can be quantified by
the contraction mapping constant. For the IUA and RUA, the
contraction constants are equal to
c1 = max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1),
c2 = τ¯ · max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1) + (1− τ).
The smaller c1 and c2 are, the faster the algorithms converge
to the Nash equilibrium, and more efficient for the microgrids
to respond to the power generation changes from the gen-
erator network. For both IUA and RUA, smaller values of
maxi,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
and Nd are desirable. The two parameters
are related to the smart grid topology and the number of
microgrids, respectively. A smaller Nd can be interpreted as
a smaller number of players, which makes it easier to reach
a consensus. In addition, the values of τ¯ and τ also have
an impact on the convergence speed of RUA. Specifically, a
smaller τ¯ and a larger τ result in faster convergence.
Remark 6: Since τ¯ ≥ τ , then, for a given τ¯ or τ , the best
outcome is achieved at τ¯ = τ , which means that every player
has the same update probability.
V. RESILIENCY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
The implementation of the fully distributed algorithm pro-
posed in Section IV-C merely requires the information of
market electricity price and smart grid topology. To study the
resiliency of the algorithm, we focus on two fault models of
the power system network. In addition, we develop a control
framework to implement the algorithm in the smart grid.
A. Fault Models of Smart Grid
Without loss of generality, we discuss two major types of
faults in the smart grid: (i) generator breakdown [14], and
(ii) open-circuit of the transmission line [29]. Specifically, the
breakdown of generator i can be captured by P gi = 0, i ∈ Ng.
Note that microgrid can be turned off during the operation,
and this case can be captured by P gi = 0, i ∈ Nd. The open-
circle fault of the transmission line between buses i and j
could lead to Bij = 0, Pij = Pji = 0, i 6= j ∈ N , where Pij
denotes the power flow from bus i to bus j. For the balance
and stability of the smart grid, generator or microgrid outage
will increase the power generation of some other entities in
the system. While the trip of a transmission line results in the
re-dispatch of power in the smart grid.
Other failure and attacks models can also be studied using
this framework including data injection attacks [30], [31], un-
availability of PMU data [32], and jamming attacks [33], [34].
The fault models chosen here represent the major physical
consequences of the cyber attacks.
B. Implementation Framework
The proposed framework used to implement the PMU-
enabled distributed algorithm is shown in Fig. 2. On one hand,
renewable energy generators in the microgrids produce power
and store them in the storage devices. On the other hand, the
PMU measures the voltage angle θ(n)i at bus i at time interval
n, and sends it to the controller. Then, the controller generates
a command based on the PMU-enabled distributed algorithm
that informs the storage device to inject P (n+1)i amount of
renewable energy to bus i. Note that negative P (n+1)i indicates
that player i buys power from the grid.
In the framework, the power storage can be seen as
unchanged during the implementation stage if the decision
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Storage
PMU
Distributed algorithm 
based controller
Renewable energy 
generation
 Power
Grid
Microgrids
Load
Generation 
command

  

( +1)
 

!
 
"
( )
 
 
Fig. 2. The framework to implement the PMU-enabled distributed algorithm.
PMU measures the voltage angle at the bus, and the controller generates a
command regarding the amount of microgrid renewable energy injection from
the local storage to the grid based on the received voltage angle.
TABLE I
NUMERICAL VALUE OF PARAMETERS IN SIMULATION
Parameter Value Parameter Value
ψ3 120$/MWh P l3 120MW
ψ6 100$/MWh P l4 100MW
ψ14 80$/MWh P l6 105MW
ζ 140$/MWh P l8 110MW
P g1 280MW P
l
10 90MW
P g11 160MW P
l
12 85MW
η 3× 104 P l14 70MW
updates of microgrids are fast comparing with the physical
storage dynamics. Under the condition that the microgrids
make strategies over a period of time, then the storage dynam-
ics need to be considered, and the algorithm is generalized to
the dynamic setting.
Remark 7: The PMU-enabled algorithm is applicable at
buses where PMU is installed. For nodes without PMU sen-
sors, IUA and RUA can be used for the update. Then, the
algorithm can be generalized to a hybrid one.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we validate our proposed algorithms via case
studies based on the IEEE 14-bus system. Fig. 3 shows the
power system model. Buses 3, 6 and 14 are three players in the
power generation game, and they are connected to microgrids
that generate wind, solar, geothermal renewable energies, re-
spectively. Generation bus 2 is selected as the slack bus which
serves as a basis of the power system and also absorbs the
power uncertainties in the grid [14], [35]. Power transmission
line parameters of the 14-bus system can be found in [36].
Without loss of generality, the weighting parameters ηi = η
are the same for ∀i ∈ Nd, and the generation capacity of
microgrid i is equal to P gi,max = 100MW, ∀i ∈ Nd. Other
parameters for the case studies are summarized in Table I. For
convenience, the number in the subscript of each parameter
denotes the bus indexing in Fig. 3.
A. Effectiveness of Algorithms
Based on the grid shown in Fig. 3, we obtain Nd = 3,
and the elements in S corresponding to microgrids constitute
Load C
Load F
Microgrid 2
Microgrid 3
G1
G2
G3
Microgrid 1
Load A
Load D
Load G
Load B
Load E
1
2 3
45
6 7
891011
12 13 14
Fig. 3. IEEE 14-Bus power system model. Buses 3, 6 and 14 are connected
to microgrids that generate renewable energies and are three players in the
power generation game.
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Fig. 4. (a) and (b) shows the results of the renewable energy generations
and the bus voltage angles of the three microgrids by using IUA, respectively.
a submatrix
S′ =
0.1212 0.0371 0.03490.0371 0.3850 0.1471
0.0349 0.1471 0.3909
 .
Then, based on S′, we obtain maxi,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
= 0.382.
Therefore, the sufficient condition maxi,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd−1) <
1 is satisfied. The results of the iterative update algorithm are
shown in Fig. 4. The algorithm converges to the Nash equilib-
rium P g∗3 = 55.1MW, P
g∗
6 = 34.7MW and P
g∗
14 = 27.9MW
after 7 iterations.
To test the RUA, we set τ¯ = τ = 0.6 for simplicity,
and it also satisfies the sufficient condition in Theorem 3.
The results of RUA are shown in Fig. 5. We can see that
the algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium after 14
iterations. Moreover, the values of P g∗3 , P
g∗
6 and P
g∗
14 at
equilibrium are the same as those obtained by using the IUA
which validates the effectiveness of RUA.
B. Resiliency of the Distributed Algorithm
For each update, each player needs to measure the voltage
angle at his bus via PMU. In the following case studies, we
set τ1 = 0.65, τ2 = 0.7 and τ3 = 0.8 for three players,
respectively. Thus, τ¯ = 0.8 and τ = 0.65. We can verify that
the sufficient condition in Theorem 3 is still satisfied. For a
better illustration of the resilience property, we add the failure
to the smart grid when the system is at an equilibrium state.
1) Generator Breakdown: We consider the scenario that
generator G3 connecting with bus 12 is out of service at time
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Iteration
Po
w
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
(M
W
)
Renewable energy generations vs. Number of iterations under RUA
 
 
Microgrid 1
Microgrid 2
Microgrid 3
(a)
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Iteration
Vo
lta
ge
 a
ng
le
 (d
eg
ree
)
Voltage angle vs. Number of iterations under RUA
 
 
Bus at microgrid 1
Bus at microgrid 2
Bus at microgrid 3
(b)
Fig. 5. (a) and (b) shows the results of the renewable energy generations and
the bus voltage angles of the three microgrids by using RUA, respectively.
step 19. The results are shown in Fig. 6(a). The first equilib-
rium is the same as that obtained by using IUA and RUA.
After the fault, the PDA re-converges to a new equilibrium
point P g∗3 = 60.3MW, P
g∗
6 = 47.8MW and P
g∗
14 = 46.7MW
in another 10 time steps which reveals the resiliency of the
algorithm.
2) Microgrid Turn-off: When microgrid 3 at bus 14 is
turned off at time step 19, the results are shown in Fig.
6(b). The distributed algorithm can reach a new equilibrium
P g∗3 = 62.6MW, P
g∗
6 = 36.5MW and P
g∗
14 = 0MW only
in 4 steps after the shutdown of microgrid 3. The faster
convergence rate in this case than that of generator breakdown
is due to the number of players is reduced from 3 to 2 which
validates the analysis in Section IV-D.
3) Open-circuit Fault of Transmission Line: We consider
the scenario that the transmission line connecting buses 8
and 14 in the grid is of open-circuit fault at time step 19.
The results for this case are shown in Fig. 6(c). We can
see that PDA is still able to re-converge to an equilibrium
P g∗3 = 57.9MW, P
g∗
6 = 36.4MW and P
g∗
7 = 16.4MW in 7
other time steps after the fault occurs, and the new equilibrium
leads to power re-dispatch in the smart grid.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have used a game-theoretic framework to
capture the interactions between microgrids in a power system.
In addition, we have proposed a resilient and fully distributed
algorithm for microgrids to update their strategy on the amount
of renewable energy generation. The knowledge that microgrid
requires is only the voltage angle at his bus which can be
measured by PMU. The effectiveness and resiliency of the
algorithm have been validated via case studies based on the
IEEE 14-bus system. One future work would be considering
the generators in the smart grid as leaders, and designing
efficient, resilient and distributed algorithms for microgrids.
The second extension would be incorporating the storage dy-
namics into the established framework, and obtaining dynamic
optimal power scheduling policies for players. Another future
work would be investigating the security of PMU devices, and
making the algorithm more resilient when PMU measured data
contains errors.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: Remind that −B is a real symmetric reduced
Laplacian matrix, and −Bij ≤ 0 for ∀i 6= j ∈ N . In addition,∑
j∈N |Bij | ≤ |Bii|, ∀i ∈ N . Thus, −B is diagonally
dominant. Since −B is invertible, and −Bii > 0, ∀i ∈ N ,
−B is positive definite [37]. Together with non-positive off-
diagonal elements of −B, we know that −B is an M -matrix.
Let c > 0 be the largest diagonal entry of −B, then, −B can
be expressed as−B = cI−A, where I is an identity matrix; and
A is a non-negative symmetric matrix. By using the Perron-
Frobenius theorem [38], ρ(A) is a positive eigenvalue of A,
where ρ(·) denotes the spectral radius of a matrix. In addition,
for any eigenvalue λ of A, c − λ is an eigenvalue of −B.
Therefore, c − ρ(A) is an eigenvalue of −B. Since −B is
positive definite, we obtain
c− ρ(A) > 0⇐⇒ c/ρ(A) > 1. (17)
Denote A˜ = 1cA, and −B˜ = − 1cB. Then, −B˜ = I−A˜. Note
that ρ(A˜) = 1cρ(A) < 1 by (17). The summation of infinite
series
−B˜
∞∑
n=0
(A˜)n = (I− A˜)
∞∑
n=0
(A˜)n =
∞∑
n=0
(A˜)n −
∞∑
n=1
(A˜)n
= (A˜)0 = I.
Therefore, we obtain −(B˜)−1 = ∑∞n=0(A˜)n, and
−B−1 = −(cB˜)−1 = −1
c
(B˜)−1 =
1
c
∞∑
n=0
(A˜)n.
Note that −B−1 = [sij ]i,j∈N is a summation of a series of
non-negative symmetric matrices, and thus −B−1 is symmet-
ric, and sij ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ N . Furthermore, since (A˜)0 = I, and∑∞
n=1(A˜)
n is non-negative, then, sii > 0, ∀ i ∈ N .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: When the equilibrium solution P∗d is an inner point,
to show its uniqueness, one way is to show that matrix H is
invertible. Since S is of full rank, and base on the Sylvester’s
criterion, the upper left Nd-dimensional square matrix S1 in
S is also invertible. Note that determinant |S1| 6= 0 and it
satisfies |S1| = |H| ·
∏
i∈Nd sii. Because sii > 0, ∀i ∈ Nd,
|H| 6= 0 and thus H is invertible. Therefore, game G˜ admits a
unique Nash equilibrium in this case.
Then, we consider the case that some players achieve the
boundary at the equilibrium and show that the boundary
solution is unique. For convenience, we reorganize the players’
indexing as follows: players {1, 2, ...,M1}, {M1 + 1, ...,M2}
and {M2+1, ..., Nd} are with inner, zero and maximum power
generation at the equilibrium, respectively. When M2 = Nd,
no player generates the maximum power at the equilibrium,
while M1 = M2 indicates that all players generate power at
the equilibrium. In addition, we delete the rows and columns
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Fig. 6. All three faults occur at time step 19. (a), (b) and (c) show the renewable energy generations of three microgrids related to the generator G3 turn-off,
microgrid 3 shut down, and open-circuit of the transmission line 8-14 in the smart grid, respectively.
corresponding to the players with the boundary power gener-
ation in (9) which yields
1 s12s11
s13
s11
· · · s1M1s11
s21
s22
1 s23s22 · · ·
s2M1
s22
...
...
...
. . .
...
sM11
sM1M1
sM12
sM1M1
· · · sM1(M1−1)sM1M1 1


P ∗1
P ∗2
...
P ∗M1
 = q
†
M1
⇔ HM1P∗d,M1 = q†M1 , (18)
where q†M1 := [q
†
1, q
†
2, ..., q
†
M1
]′, q†i := qi −
1
sii
(
si(M1+1)P
max
M1+1
+ si(M1+2)P
max
M1+2
+ ...+ siM2P
max
M2
)
for
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M1}. It directly follows that HM1 is invertible,
and thus the solution P∗d,M1 exists and is unique. The reason
that the boundary solution is an equilibrium is as follows.
The payoff function (7) for player i is quadratic and convex.
For the cases γi ≤ g¯−i − siiP li and γi ≥ g¯−i + siiPmaxi ,
player i’s optimal response with respect to P g−i is achieved at
P g∗i = 0 and P
g∗
i = P
max
i , respectively.
Next, we argue that the boundary solution is unique. One
possible case is that player i, i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M1}, achieves the
boundary power at the equilibrium. This case is ruled out when
we construct (18). Another possible case is that player j, j ∈
{M1 + 1,M1 + 2, ..., Nd}, has the inner power generation.
This cannot be a Nash equilibrium either, since player j can
achieve a better payoff at the boundary. Other possible cases
can be a combination of these two cases and can be easily
eliminated through similar analysis. Therefore, the boundary
Nash equilibrium solution is unique.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: First, define ∆P (n)i := P
(n)
i − P ∗i , i ∈ Nd.
When Pmaxi > P
∗
i > −P li , ∀i ∈ Nd, and given all players’
generated renewable energy except ith player’s at time step n,
we have the following:
(1) g¯(n)−i − siiP li < γi < g¯(n)−i + siiPmaxi :
∆P
(n+1)
i = P
(n+1)
i − P ∗i
=
1
sii
(
γi − g¯(n)−i
)− 1
sii
(
γi − g¯∗−i
)
=
1
sii
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij
(
P ∗j − P (n)j
)
= − 1
sii
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij∆P
(n)
j .
(2) γi ≤ g¯(n)−i − siiP li :
∆P
(n+1)
i = −P li − P ∗i (negative)
>
1
sii
(
γi − g¯(n)−i
)− 1
sii
(
γi − g¯∗−i
)
= − 1
sii
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij∆P
(n)
j .
(3) γi ≥ g¯(n)−i + siiPmaxi :
∆P
(n+1)
i = P
max
i − P ∗i (positive)
<
1
sii
(
γi − g¯(n)−i
)− 1
sii
(
γi − g¯∗−i
)
= − 1
sii
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij∆P
(n)
j .
To sum up,
|∆P (n+1)i |

<
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
|∆P (n)j |, if γi ≤ g¯(n)−i − siiP li ,
or γi ≥ g¯(n)−i + siiPmaxi ,
=
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
|∆P (n)j |, otherwise.
When the generated renewable energy of an arbitrary player
i at the Nash equilibrium point is 0, i.e., P ∗i = −P li , then
through similar analysis, we have
|∆P (n+1)i |
 = 0, if γi ≤ g¯−i − siiP
l
i ,
<
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
|∆P (n)j |, otherwise.
In addition, when the generated power of player i at the
Nash equilibrium point is P gi,max, i.e., P
∗
i = P
max
i , then,
|∆P (n+1)i |
 = 0, if γi ≥ g¯−i + siiP
max
i ,
<
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
|∆P (n)j |, otherwise.
Therefore,
|∆P (n+1)i | ≤
1
sii
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij |∆P (n)j | (19)
holds for all three cases at any time step n.
Next, let ‖∆P‖∞ denote the infinity-norm of the vector
(∆P1,∆P2, ...,∆PNd)
T , i.e., ‖∆P‖∞ = maxi∈Nd |∆Pi|.
Then, we have
‖∆P (n+1)‖∞ ≤ max
i∈Nd
{ 1
sii
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij |∆P (n)j |
}
≤ max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1)‖∆P (n)‖∞.
Therefore, maxi,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1) < 1 is a sufficient
condition under which (19) is a contraction mapping that
ensures the global stability and convergence of IUA.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: Based on (19), we have the following
E(|∆P (n+1)i |)
= E
(
|∆P (n+1)i |
∣∣∣ Pi updates at time n) · τi
+ E
(
|∆P (n)i |
∣∣∣ Pi does not update at time n) · (1− τi)
≤ τi
sii
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sij · E(|∆P (n)i |) + (1− τi) · E(|∆P (n)i |).
Define ‖∆P‖∞ := maxi∈Nd E(|∆Pi|). Then,
max
i∈Nd
E(|∆P (n+1)i |) ≤ max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
τi
sij
sii
(Nd − 1)‖∆P (n)‖∞
+ max
i
(1− τi)‖∆P (n)‖∞,
which is equivalent to
‖∆P (n+1)‖∞ ≤(
τ¯ · max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1) + (1− τ)
)
‖∆P (n)‖∞. (20)
Therefore, τ¯ ·maxi,j 6=i∈Nd sijsii (Nd− 1) + (1− τ) < 1 implies
τ¯ · max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1) < τ (21)
which is a sufficient condition that leads the right hand side in
(20) to a contraction mapping, and thus ensures the stability
and convergence of the random update algorithm in the infinity
norm. Next, we show a stronger convergence, almost sure
convergence, of the algorithm under (21).
From (20), we have
‖∆P (n)‖∞ ≤ ξ‖∆P (n−1)‖∞ ≤ ... ≤ ξn‖∆P (0)‖∞, (22)
where 0 < ξ < 1. Moreover, by using the Markov inequality,
we obtain
∞∑
n=1
Pr
(|∆P (n)i | > ) ≤ ∞∑
n=1
E(|∆P (n)i |)

≤ 1

∞∑
n=1
‖∆P (n)‖∞, (23)
where  > 0 and Pr(·) is the probability measure. Inserting
(22) into (23) yields
∞∑
n=1
Pr
(|∆P (n)i | > ) ≤ 1
∞∑
n=1
ξn‖∆P (0)‖∞
=
1− ξ∞
(1− ξ)‖∆P
(0)‖∞
=
1
(1− ξ)‖∆P
(0)‖∞.
Therefore, the increasing sequence
∑N
n=1 Pr(|∆P (n)i | > )
is upper bounded by 1(1−ξ)‖∆P (0)‖∞ with the augment
of N , which indicates the convergence of the sequence∑N
n=1 Pr(|∆P (n)i | > ) for ∀ > 0. By using the Borel-
Cantelli lemma [39], we obtain
Pr
(
lim sup
n→∞
{|∆P (n)i | > }
)
= 0, ∀i ∈ Nd,
which implies that the proposed random update algorithm
converges to the unique Nash equilibrium almost surely when
(21) is satisfied.
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